This paper will seek to argue that the positivist attempts at separating legally valid rules from assessments of their moral justness are futile and incomplete at best.
Introduction
Why do we obey the law? This question has resounded in jurisprudential minds for centuries, and since the birth of law, the reasons behind what makes it law as such has become just as important a question as its actual content. The central and complex concept of this issue is whether our obeying of the law can be strictly free from moral assessments. Can a rule be legally valid without it being morally just?
This paper will seek to argue that the positivist attempts at separating legally valid rules from assessments of their moral justness are futile and incomplete at best.
Throughout each stage that a legal rule is applied requires some reference to moral standards, so that it may never be simply legally valid without being morally evaluated also. This is not to state that unjust laws cannot exist, it is rather to claim that the very principles which make a rule legally valid are in themselves evidence of the moral valuations, or the expectations of a society subjected to it. Fundamentally, while there is an inherent difference in the content and criteria of legally valid rules and morally just rules, they are interconnected and co-dependent, so that what becomes legally valid must be morally just and vice versa.
When a Rule is Valid Law -Legal Obligations
The determination of when rules are valid law is the subject of debate amongst positivist theories, though all claim the irrelevance of moralistic judgements as determining the legal validity of a rule. Let us begin with a rule which states that drinking alcohol in public is illegal, and will be punishable at law by six months community service. How do we recognise this cluster of words as a law which we must either abide by or accept the sanction for breaching it? What characteristics does it possess that cause members of a society to observe and obey it as law? Hart views law as a 'social phenomenon' 5 which can be explained by reference to the social practices of humans in any given society. According to Hart, those who make law must create it according to the rule of recognition in order to assign rules legal validity. A form of secondary rule, the rule of recognition provides us with a set of criteria which those in power must follow if a primary rule is to be classed as legally valid by citizens: a 'common, public standard of correct judicial decision'. 6 Yet it is much more profound than this seemingly simple explanation.
Hart refers to certain human weaknesses which we are able to recognise and acknowledge that, if we are to co-exist in society, we must refrain from committing certain acts. The authority we assign to law is thus based on social traits, and this Let's turn to the art of interpretation and decision in the courtroom. Judges have the task of applying the law to individual cases and circumstances. Can this be adequately undertaken without reference to some moral bases underlying the law?
Does not the existence of differing opinions and dicta between judges highlight that perhaps moral validity is relevant at least in the courtroom? Cases such as Re A (Conjoined Twins) 12 highlight the unavoidable imposition of moral valuations in many cases, where recourse to legally valid law is simply not enough.
Dworkin claims that in such hard cases political and moral assessments are necessary: 'the diversity suggests that there is no single social rule that validates all relevant reasons...for judicial decisions'. 13 Non-legal standards can be found in judge decisions constantly; where legislation does not provide the answer, judges have no choice but to refer to moral and political assessments in order to decide on a hard case and thus 'justify the network as a whole'. 14 If we are to assess this element in conjunction with hard cases, then the argument is vastly strengthened, that decisions cannot always be free from non-legal considerations.
It thus follows that moralistic assessments simply cannot be adequately separated from the legal validity of the law. Moreover, the constant reforming and development of the law symbolises the ever-changing outlooks of society and its attitudes towards the moral undertones of legal rules and the acts it prohibits. Critics of this statement claim that such non-legal assessments take place because legal sources enable them to, 15 and it is important to note that a claim to the connection between law and morality does not lead to a claim that law is necessarily just by virtue of such a connection.
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Conclusion
While a full account of the rich topic is beyond the scope of this paper, it has necessarily sought to disprove, or highlight the weaknesses in the positivist separation of legal and moral valuations of the law. It has been argued that such a separation is both impossible and of little use. It is also the case that claims to the moral validity of law do not fall victim to criticisms as to why we may obey unjust law and the dreaded subjectivity of moralistic outlooks.
It is simply unavoidable that claims against the legal validity of law being connected to the justness of law are weak: 'natural and positive law govern the same subject-matter, and relate, therefore, to the same norm-object'. 20 The law informs us what we must do and what we must refrain from doing. So to focus on its legal validity in isolation does nothing to explain from where such prohibitions and obligations derive. It is necessary to ask whether law is just, else legally valid laws prohibiting the driving of red vehicles would not attract the public outrage it is (rationally) predicted to. 
